The power of signaling: presidential leadership and rhetoric over 20 years by Kiessling T. et al.
Leadership & Organization Development Journal
The power of signaling: presidential leadership and rhetoric over 20 years
Timothy Kiessling, Thomas M. Martin, Burze Yasar,
Article information:
To cite this document:
Timothy Kiessling, Thomas M. Martin, Burze Yasar, (2017) "The power of signaling: presidential
leadership and rhetoric over 20 years", Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 38
Issue: 5, pp.662-678, https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-03-2016-0059
Permanent link to this document:
https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-03-2016-0059
Downloaded on: 27 June 2018, At: 10:34 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 71 other documents.
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 232 times since 2017*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
(2017),"Assessing the influence of leadership style, organizational learning and organizational
innovation", Leadership &amp; Organization Development Journal, Vol. 38 Iss 5 pp. 590-609 <a
href="https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-11-2015-0261">https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-11-2015-0261</a>
(2017),"The relationship between transformational leadership and work attitudes: Comparing
mediating influences of social identity and the psychological contract", Leadership &amp;
Organization Development Journal, Vol. 38 Iss 5 pp. 646-661 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/
LODJ-11-2015-0248">https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-11-2015-0248</a>
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by emerald-
srm:145363 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald
for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission
guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company
manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as
well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and
services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the









































































The power of signaling:
presidential leadership and
rhetoric over 20 years
Timothy Kiessling
Department of Management, Bilkent Universitesi, Ankara, Turkey
Thomas M. Martin
Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky, USA, and
Burze Yasar
TED University, Ankara, Turkey
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the power of leadership rhetoric with a theoretical
foundation of signaling theory. Past research mostly focus on followers and not other stakeholders and the
authors attempt to fill that research gap.
Design/methodology/approach – The research explored nearly 20 years and 51,500 pages of information
from US presidents and explored the impact on stock market volatility using generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity.
Findings – The research findings suggest that leaders can/do have a powerful impact on stakeholders.
In particular negative statements will cause the greatest reaction due to risk adverse stockholders, neutral
rhetoric will calm the market and decrease volatility and positive rhetoric was not significant.
Research limitations/implications – Past research suggests that a focus on the consequences of
leadership rhetoric be explored and the research suggests that people do respond to powerful leaders, even if
they are not followers. Also the authors filled a gap in regard to the impact of leader communication about
economic and marketplace events.
Practical implications – Practitioners benefit from the research as they can focus upon the US presidents’
rhetoric and strategically apply the research as they can predict the movement of the stock market
immediately thereafter.
Originality/value – Very little research has ever explored the impact of a leader’s rhetoric and the
subsequent economic impact, and no one has explored in particular the president’s rhetorical impact (who is
considered by many the top leader in the USA).
Keywords Leadership, Rhetoric, Stock market, President
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Recent research on the use of imagery in the campaign speeches of President Barrack Obama
and contender John McCain suggest how influential rhetoric can be over stakeholders
(McGuire et al., 2016). Although presidential leadership research continues (Williams et al., 2012)
very little leadership literature has focused on how leaders react to, and communicate about,
economic andmarketplace events (Bligh and Hess, 2007). Also, past research indicates that most
approaches to leadership focus almost extensively on followers and not upon other stakeholders
(Ammeter et al., 2002) while adequate consideration to the context as well as the consequences
of leaders’ behaviors should be explored (House and Aditya, 1997). Our research attempts to
address all 3 of these contentions (i.e. other stakeholders than a follower which in our research
is the investment community, consequences of behaviors, and communication about economic/
marketplace events).
Rhetorical leadership in regard to the president has been described as information of which
the president expresses publicly (Wood et al., 2002; Wood, 2004; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). There is
a robust body of literature on the president and their rhetorical impact on the economy
(not market volatility of which we investigate) (i.e. Wood et al., 2002; Wood, 2004), but as
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Eshbaugh-Soha (2005, p. 719) notes, “[…] we do not have a theory of how presidents might
influence the economy directly through their rhetoric,” and little literature on how the president’s
rhetorical signals influence the stock market. Presidential rhetoric is the most underappreciated
force in politics, because it does not disappear, rather presidential rhetoric lasts forever.
Presidential rhetoric can have five key characteristics: First, it is memorable and can
shape how we discuss and view a myriad of topics. Second, presidential rhetoric can be
uplifting. Third, presidential rhetoric can be depressing. Fourth, presidential rhetoric can
have life or death consequences. Fifth, presidential rhetoric can be persuasive. In regard to
presidential rhetoric and the economy, past research suggests that there is a correlation
between presidential rhetoric and inflation and unemployment (Wood et al., 2002).
Other research suggest that presidential signals seem to have an impact as long as they
have the authority to act on those signals, act in the short run, and have a measure of
credibility in the workplace. Presidential rhetoric is an influential instrument of economic
leadership that can affect the marketplace’s perception of current and future economic
conditions and is a cue for businesses and consumer making decisions on investment and
spending (Wood, 2004; Wood et al., 2005).
The electronic media has created a greater impact over what presidents say and is very
quickly disseminated (immediately in many cases). This assisted our study as we utilized as
many informational variations such as press conferences, Q&A sessions with reporters, radio
addresses, addresses to joint sessions of Congress, addresses to the nation, and
announcements of economic programs for about 20 years filling over 51,500 pages of
information. The purpose of this study was to assess the influence of leadership rhetoric by
using one of the most significant leaders in the USA, the president of the USA, as they can
focus the public’s attention on a particular issue through presidential rhetoric (Baumgartner
and Jones, 1993). Economic policy is an important factor to the presidency as research
suggests it correlates to future electoral success (Campbell, 2000); so presidents will frequently
devote a large share of their rhetoric in discussing current economic conditions and potential
solutions (Eshbaugh-soha and Peake, 2005). Yet we found no research that attempted to
explore whether this economic presidential rhetoric had any effect stock market volatility.
Stock market volatility is the non-normal buying and selling of stock, while the stock market
in total does not change, also known as a rebalancing of portfolio. Hence, our research
explores leadership rhetoric through the US presidents and to measure its subsequent impact
on the investment community through stock market volatility.
Our research is important for a variety of reasons. First, we measure the influence of
leadership rhetoric by the consequences of the reactions in the marketplace (or lack thereof).
In addition, we explore the empirical impact of this critical communication format. Other
past leadership research in regard to the president, primarily focuses on presidential
charisma, popularity ratings, etc. But, past research (except for a few exceptions) has not
explored the consequences of presidential rhetoric directly toward the investment
community. In particular, we focus on presidential rhetoric in regard to the economy,
inflation, interest rates and the deficit and the reaction by experts in the marketplace,
the investors. Extensive research, and the foundation for most economic and finance theory,
suggests that new information will cause investors to immediately react, but there has been
limited research performed as to whether presidential rhetoric has the ability and
importance to affect the stock market. Our paper is organized as follows: we explore the
leadership research in regard to leadership rhetoric, then introduce the underlying
theoretical foundation of signaling theory, then proceed into our methods.
Leadership and leader rhetoric
Leadership research continues to be very active, and over the years has given birth to







































much research that has performed comprehensive reviews and as such will not replicate
their work (e.g., Bligh et al., 2011; Mumford, 2011; Gardner et al., 2010; Bass, 1990; House and
Aditya, 1997; Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992) but will focus on the research gap that we are
exploring. Rhetorical leadership can be either formal and/or informal communication used
by leaders to convey their message to stakeholders (Naidoo and Lord, 2008).
Rhetorical leadership has been explored in recent leadership research including, how
Bush’s speeches changed after the September 11 crisis (Bligh et al., 2004), that Federal Reserve
Chairman rhetoric was a manifestation of his leadership style (Bligh and Hess, 2007), use of
metaphors in a leader’s rhetoric to inspire audiences (Mio et al., 2005), how imagery in a
leader’s rhetoric impacted ratings of charisma (Emrich et al., 2001), how presidential
expressions of optimism influence marketplace performance (Wood et al., 2005), how CEO
speeches are related to globalization intent (Den Hartog and Verburg, 1997), and which type of
leadership rhetoric can be effective for social change (Seyranian and Bligh, 2008).
Rhetorical leadership is important for the president of the USA as there is extensive media
exposure and then subsequent public scrutiny (Foti et al., 1982). The role of the executive
branch has evolved over the years and now has numerous foci from international engagement
to discussions about the economy, with the president having much discretionary action
through his use of rhetoric (Renshon, 1998). Presidential leadership is a relational process
through which the president is constantly interacting with stakeholders (Neustadt, 1960)
and with new technologies and 24/7 cable television rhetoric becomes more central in the
evaluation of an administration’s handling of complex environmental problems.
Our research, however, continues the stream of research in regard to rhetorical
leadership and leadership effectiveness (Naidoo and Lord, 2008). The president has the
leadership role to influence others and proactively pursues an agenda impacting
stakeholders (Deluga, 1998). This leadership role identifies opportunities, takes direct action
and perseveres until the goal is accomplished (Bateman and Crant, 1993). For example,
recent research suggests presidential rhetoric is a policy making instrument to expand
presidential power (Rottinghaus and Maier, 2007) and can set the country’s agenda
(Kingdon, 1995). Presidential power can be utilized in differing ways without the consent of
Congress, the courts, and the public, by signaling to the public through rhetoric a focus and
a possible future agenda (Elsea, 2003; Deering and Maltzman, 1999).
Communication is an essential aspect of the leadership process (e.g. Bligh et al., 2004;
Conger and Toegel, 2002; Insch et al., 1997) and the leadership relationship to stakeholders is
grounded in language and the process of communication (Conger, 1991; Fiol et al., 1999;
House and Shamir, 1993). Leadership is the process of attempting to frame and define
circumstances for other individuals (Smircich and Morgan, 1982). Presidents are
continuously commenting, formally and informally, on issues throughout each day to
assist to explain events that are occurring in the public and international arena. Yet,
the research question then becomes:
RQ1. Is there any impact on stakeholders (in specific, investors) due to this rhetoric
(e.g. is the rhetoric effective)?
Leadership and signaling theory
We use signaling theory as our theoretical foundation as presidential proclamations are
often symbolic in nature and as such carry important substantive policy influence affecting
the marketplace, but may offer no concrete policy change at that time (Rottinghaus and
Maier, 2007). The unexpected timing of statements of economy, inflation, interest rates and
the deficit will cause signals to be observed by the market place affecting investor decisions.
Signaling theory is in regard to information asymmetry, as some individuals/organizations







































people know different things, hence signaling theory focuses on information asymmetry
reduction. Public information is freely available, yet is only a portion of information that is
available, as much information is private and only certain people may have access to it.
There are a number of studies that discuss signals in the management field. For example,
present-focused rhetoric by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board signaled to the
markets that the Fed was working on the current situation (Bligh and Hess, 2007);
a workgroup leader displaying ethical leadership of dependability, self-discipline,
responsibility and high standards will signal this behavior such as the group will develop
a norm consistent with that behavior (Walumbwa et al., 2012); leaders have multiple
reputations, each signaling a likelihood of behavior to a given social context (Hall et al., 2004);
celebrity CEOs leadership success is founded on reputation which is grounded in signaling
theory and on theories of mass communication (Treadway et al., 2009); the top leaders in
multinational organizations signal through informal web-based memos appropriate practices
for subsidiaries and future leaders (Novicevic and Harvey, 2004).
The basis for signaling theory is that the positive or negative private information
unavailable to others will be useful if one has access (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). This private
information has a privileged perspective regarding either new information, or additional
new details regarding older information. As presidents are insiders with access to numerous
and varied privileged information, they must determine which information they wish to
disclose, and as such signaling takes on a greater value due to its selective nature.
Presidents also enjoy the foundation of a “positivity bias” on how the public views the
president (Greenstein, 1974; Edwards and Wayne, 1997).
Although the signal itself is important, the “quality” of the signaler has been identified in
the research as significant (Connelly et al., 2011). Quality of a signal has been identified with
the reputation of the signaler (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) and/or prestige of the signaler
(Certo, 2003) as there is much market noise and signaling and investors will only focus on
legitimate information. Recent research supports this assertion as a critical component to
signaling theory as both the sender’s identity and the signal sent, work together for
credibility, with the president as the credible individual who is signaling new information to
the marketplace (Cameron et al., 2000).
The marketplace environment is fraught with signals, insider information, public
information, misinformation and noise that affect the reduction of information asymmetry
(Lester et al., 2006). For example, presidential rhetoric may provide an appropriate signal,
but the media outlets then comment and report introducing possible changes and alterations
(Carter, 2006). Other receivers influencing one another also have an opportunity to alter/
influence signals for their own advantage (Branzei et al., 2004). A bandwagon effect can then
occur as those that are not sure how to interpret a signal look to others and their actions,
translating into potential market volatility (Sliwka, 2007).
Research suggests that most market situations will involve multiple signalers,
multiple people receiving the signals, thus incurring varying signals (Connelly et al., 2011).
As all investors are constantly seeking market information for portfolio decision making,
any information from a respected qualified source would affect these decisions. Adding to
the complexity of signals is the presence of false signalers, thus placing more emphasis
on the quality of the signal (Ndofor and Levitas, 2004), and as such, presidential
rhetoric becomes more valuable due to its inherent quality. The signal honesty, veracity,
genuineness/suspiciousness, or the associated underlying quality of the signaler is
high in presidential rhetoric due to the signaler’s integrity (Durcikova and Gray, 2009;
Cohen and Dean, 2005).
Presidents “go public” with information unexpectedly which signals the importance of
the new rhetoric and just mentioning an issue heightens public concern while ignoring an







































president is the most visible economic commentator in the US system and that
the president’s optimism or pessimism when speaking about the economy can have
significant effects on US economic growth and unemployment affecting consumer
perception of the current and future economic conditions (Wood et al., 2002; Wood, 2004). To
compare the influence of the president to marketplace reaction, research suggests the second
most powerful man in America is the Federal Reserve Board Chairman who can send the
financial markets into chaos with his rhetoric.
The existing literature suggests that US president is not responding to the marketplace,
but is attempting to “craft the future,” as announcements from the president are not driven
by only poor macroeconomic performance, as presidents talk steadily about the economy
when conditions are both good and bad (Wood, 2004). The timing of marketplace rhetoric
provides further signaling as each comment is first filtered through the massive executive
branch bureaucracy. For an item to get on the president’s agenda, potential agenda items
might have to pass through 13 offices before it reached the president’s office.
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
Hypothesis development
There has been abundant research that illustrates the causality of new information to the
market and how investors react to that new information immediately, and is the foundation
of most economic and financial theory. The EMH has been the dominant theoretical
foundation suggesting that whenever new relevant information appears, investors update
their expectations appropriately and act immediately. This theory further suggests that
stock prices adjust instantaneously to unexpected events and the arrival of new
information. Recent extensions of the theory suggest that investors often overreact to new
information (the Overreaction Hypothesis) or that new information elevates uncertainty and
risk in the equity market (the Uncertain Information Hypothesis) both causing investors to
rebalance their portfolio. The only difference in these hypotheses is in how the long-term
effect of their immediate reaction to the new information affects their future decisions.
New presidential rhetoric will cause investors to react as people will overweigh new
information and underweight prior information and professional investors also display this
same overreaction to new information. Even though there can be other marketplace and firm
specific signals (i.e. dividend declaration), investors place an overly disproportionate importance
to short-term developments. Investors are often overconfident and due to investor heterogeneity
reactions will occur because of new information but the reaction may not be uniform.
For example, new information in regard to the ratings of funds will cause investors to
buy newly upgraded funds and withdraw from downgraded funds, as the rating is a signal
to investors of potential returns. An announcement of a small shortfall in reported vs
expected earnings often leads to an immediate overreaction by investors who sell the firms’
stock. Firms who only changed their name to a “.com” had dramatic increases in shareholder
wealth even though the firm, fundamentals, profit, etc. did not change.
Recent research used a comprehensive database of headlines about individual companies
and then compared to firms that did not have headline financial market information.
The results concluded that when new information was presented to the marketplace
investors overreacted to the new information. Similar research collected daily news stories
from The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Wire, and found that new information
about particular firms had both positive and negative abnormal returns due to the new
(positive or negative) information in the article.
On a broader note in regard to country-wide-specific new information, coverage of
major news item in The New York Times correlated with a reaction in financial asset
prices as investors assign importance to prominent news topics. Other research







































high degree of trading around the time of the news release. In particular,
macro-announcements about the economy, inflation, etc. showed volatility in regard to
both good news (buying of large firm stock) and bad news (selling of large firm stock).
Research into presidential rhetoric suggests it does have an effect on public reactions,
that the president has the ability to sway public opinion, and that his presidential
“saber rattling” can affect a country’s economic performance.
The importance of presidential economic rhetoric is highlighted by research that
suggests the president’s rhetoric on economic policy is signaling to congress to support his
solutions as well as to the marketplace of future changes/implementation items that may
occur. Research into signaling theory suggests that shareholders gain from making
decisions based upon the information provided by the signaler, or in this instance,
the president. Shareholders would buy or sell their stock that signal more profitable returns
based upon the future suggested by this signaling by the president.
Even of more importance to presidential rhetoric is the change in investor ownership
patterns over the years. A review of the NYSE and the NASDQ over the past two decades
suggest that the average holding period for stocks has fallen from roughly two years to about
ten months andmany of the largest-capitalization technology stocks turn over their entire share
base every two or three months. Empirical research investigating this phenomenon suggests
that when investors have short term horizons they may all herd on the same information and
may even choose to focus on information that is different from their fundamental trading
basics. Hence, short term volatility should very well react immediately to new information from
the president due to its sensitivity.
The assertion that presidential rhetoric creates a market response agrees with previous
research that the volatility of prices is directly related to the flow of information to the
market. Presidential communications could affect stock volatility as the early resolution of
uncertainty helps investors to plan. Portfolio holders show an aversion to ambiguity (payoff
probability occurrence) and this interaction between risk and ambiguity are illustrated
through stock price volatility from negative political announcements.
In summary, our primary purpose of this study is to test the influence of presidential rhetoric
by addressing its effect on the stock market. Marketplace information may have been already
been made available to investors prior to the presidential rhetoric, but the president then
confirms, denies, or puts their own twist on the information signaling his potential further
actions or policy changes. Past research suggests that information can be positive, negative or
neutral. We test the following hypothesis in regard to presidential rhetoric and the stock market:
H1. Negative presidential signaling will increase stock market volatility.
H2. Positive presidential signaling will increase stock market volatility, but less than
negative rhetoric.
H3. Neutral presidential signaling will decrease volatility in the stock market.
The rationale for our hypotheses, in summary, is that the president is very influential
and the first time they discuss marketplace information (the economy, inflation/interest
rates, or the deficit) their signals will cause investors to rebalance their portfolio to seek
firms/industries that will benefit from their signal and to exit firms/industries that may be
affected detrimentally. We hypothesize that when presidents make new positive or new
negative comments about the economy, that signal would create a short-term market
response. This immediate reaction to the new rhetoric is based upon the theoretical
foundation of the EMH that states investors will react immediately to important new market
information, and lesser/or none, to any repeat of the same information. To the best of our
knowledge, there has been no empirical work performed on the impact of the president’s







































As investors are risk averse, negative news should have a greater impact than positive
news, as research suggests the media emphasizes negative news stories. Positive news will
create volatility of those joining the “herd” to seek out greater returns. Neutral news
(those comments which are made a second time (or third time, or fourth, etc.) or are of
nothing that is of importance to the USA) will signal to investors that no new information is
forthcoming and no change in current policy thus volatility will decrease.
Sample
In order to properly collect, code, and analyze presidential signals as they relate to market
responsiveness, data are used from two primary sources and a software application was
created uniquely for this project. For presidential signals, an electronic file of the
“Public Papers of the President of the United States” provides the most thorough and
comprehensive information including press conferences, Q&A sessions with reporters,
radio addresses, addresses to joint sessions of Congress, addresses to the nation, and
announcements of economic programs of any president. Every time the president says
something about the economy it had been recorded by the Public Papers. The study covers
1981 to 1999, nearly 20 years. All prepared and unprepared statements, proclamations, etc.,
that Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton made about the economy, whether they are
positive, negative, neutral, intended or unintended, verbal or written, are coded.
The second primary source of data gathering and analysis is the Standard & Poor’s 500
(S&P 500) Index. S&P 500 Index is a weighted combination of 500 firms chosen based on
their market capitalizations and represents the large cap firms. Investors use this index to
track the broad domestic economy.
Methods
A software application was designed uniquely for this project. The first tool, the rich-text
format (RTF) document parser, reads through (parses) extremely large RTFs “Public Papers of
the President of the United States,” and isolates publication year, publication date, the
publication title (president’s remarks at a news conference, for example) and the paragraph text
under that particular title. President Reagan’s page count from 1981 to 1988 is 18,120, President
Bush’s page count from 1989 to 1992 is 10,512, and President Clinton’s page count from 1989 to
1999 is 22,906. The second tool, the natural text search engine of Oracle database technology,
provides a visual front-end on the primary database table structure. The basic keyword search
operation allows the user to search the approximately 51,500 pages for the keywords that are of
interest. Documents that match are returned into a separate tree view control. After parsing
and categorization of texts, two graduate students in separate locations examined each
paragraph and identified when the president used the keywords (Economy, Deficit, Inflation,
and Interest Rate: see below for discussion of keywords) “positively,” “negatively”, “neutrally”,
or not at all (see tests for inter-rater reliability below).
The use of computer-aided analysis offers a dramatic increase in the amount of text that can
be analyzed and automates the tediousness of human coding. However, it is not a substitute for
a good research design and computer-aided analysis does not do away with extensive human
input. For example, just looking at a sentence that contains the keyword Economy, may not
capture that the President is talking about Japan’s economy and not the USA. Moreover,
computer programs fail to pick up nuance in a president’s remarks and cannot handle words
that have more than one meaning, phrases, or idioms and thus human coding is needed.
Inter-rater reliability
As this is perceptual data, inter-rater reliability is of utmost importance. As two coders







































empirically, and when there was a disagreement, the signal could then be coded appropriately.
After two raters finish coding all keyword signals, an analysis of inter-rater agreement was
performed to establish reliability. Based on guidelines for calculating and reporting inter-rater
agreement, we followed the following steps: first, the measure of inter-rater agreement is
determined, using the proportion of percentage agreement; second, a level of 90 percent for
reliability is established; third, a pilot test is performed of 30 signals selected randomly by
year, bymonth and then by keyword; fourth, since the pilot test indicated that reliability levels
will be adequate, another sample of the signals was performed.
The percentage agreement between the two coders, adjusting for chance agreements,
equals 79.29 percent. Landis and Koch (1977, p. 165) provide a table for interpreting κ values,
and those values are reproduced in Table I. The 79.29 percent agreement between
coders suggests that inter-rater agreement is “substantial” as 81 percent is considered
“nearly perfect.” We were comfortable with our results that our data coding reflected the
correct signals from presidential rhetoric.
Presidential signal categories
Signals are identified as Positive, Negative, Neutral, or No Value by examining a list of
keywords, Economy, Deficit, Inflation, and Interest Rate (Table II). Positive signals are defined
as new optimistic economic news, initiatives, proclamations, etc. that the market would react
favorably during a given day when signaled by the president for the first time. Negative signals
are defined as new negative economic news, proclamations, sanctions, etc. that the market
would react unfavorably, signaled during a given day by the president for the first time.
Good news or bad news repeated a second time is considered neutral. Presidents often
repeat signals and rehash speeches about the economy, education, and social security,












Economy The total wealth and resources of the USA in terms of the production and consumption of goods
and services
Deficit When government spending exceeds the receipts (tax revenue) it receives in a given year. The
total accumulation of these deficits is the national debt. Governments finance deficits through
the bond market
Inflation An increase in the overall prices of goods and services in an economy and the inflation rate is
the percentage change in the consumer price index – a measure of the overall cost of the goods
and services bought by a typical consumer - from one period to the next, measured monthly
Interest
Rates
The supply of money into the system is under the partial control of the Federal Reserve System
as it manipulates the federal funds rate through the open market operations. As interest rates
increase, economic actors should borrow, consume, and invest less; as they decrease, economic









































to name a few issues. The theoretical foundation of EMH states that investors pay attention
to what the president says the first time, and any further rhetoric will have no effect.
We have grouped interest rate and inflation comments together for both statistical and face
validity purposes. In reality, interest rates and inflation and highly correlated. When a
country is experiencing high inflation, interest rates also increase. The effect on professional
investors that receive presidential rhetoric about high inflation will also react similarly to
high interest rates. Second, we found that statistically both high inflation and interest rates
were highly correlated. Finally, for statistical power for all three presidents in our 20-year
data, we need to combine the two, as there were not enough inferences separately to make
any reliable valid statistical conclusion (Tables III and IV).
Controlling for macroeconomic announcements
Presidential signals are categorized as new if the president is talking about them for the first
time. However, investors are also following official macroeconomic announcements and
these announcement releases may coincide with the presidential signals that we are
analyzing. In this regard, we need to control for a significant number of announcements in
our study including consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI), industrial
production and capacity utilization (IPCU), new residential construction, productivity and
costs, gross domestic product (GDP), employment situation (Unemp), personal income and
outlays (PI) and federal open market committee (FOMC) meeting dates. These are the major
announcements that are employed in the literature investigating effects of macroeconomic
news on the financial markets. The data for macroeconomic announcements is collected
from the website of Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. FOMC meeting dates are kindly
provided by Gurkaynak et al. (2005). Table V reports release timing, the institution that
makes the release and the frequency for the macroeconomic announcements that we include
as controls. We control for the announcement effects by employing a dummy variable which
takes one on the day of an announcement and zero otherwise.
There is also evidence that news effects differ across business cycles. Investors may react to
the same set of news differently in good and bad times. For example, Andersen et al. (2007) find
that positive PPI and CPI shocks have significant effects on stock markets during expansion
President Deficit Economy Inf&Int rates
Reagan 61 115.5 108.25
Bush 60.25 134.25 55.25
Clinton 94.86 152.43 107.86
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the average number of times President Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton signaled to the market each year, using keywords Deficit, Economy, Inflation, and Interest Rates, from




Deficit Economy Inf&Int rates
President Pos Neg Ntrl Pos Neg Ntrl Pos Neg Ntrl
Reagan 36 14 422 85 38 658 30 15 741
Bush 10 8 196 70 52 340 20 13 139
Clinton 42 7 599 53 53 887 24 8 704
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the number of times President Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
sent a positive and negative signal to the market, using keywords Deficit, Economy, Inflation, and Interest











































while the same inflationary shocks do not have a significant effect on stock markets during
recession. In this respect, investors may also react differently to presidential signals during
expansions and recessions. Although our macroeconomic announcement day dummies may
interact with the business cycle timing, we control for the business cycle effect with employing
dummies for the recessions. The data for the chronology of business cycles are obtained from
the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research. We have only three recessions in our
sample period. The first one starts January 1980 and lasts for six months. The second one starts
July 1981 and lasts for 16 months. The final recession starts July 1990 and lasts eight months.
Empirical tests
This study explores how the president’s rhetorical signals influence the stock market
volatility of S&P 500 Composite Index. In order to capture the time varying nature of the
conditional variance of returns of the indices, we use generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) modeling. Widely used GARCH processes use past
unpredictable parts of returns, generally referred to as shocks, to predict the future













where Rt is the return on an asset at time t, εt the forecast error or shock, σt the conditional
variance of Rt, ω, αi and βj are the parameters, p and q refer to the number of lags of
Announcement Source Frequency Timing
Real activity
Industrial production FRB Monthly On or around the 16th of the month
Capacity utilization FRB Monthly On or around the 16th of the month
Employment situation BLS Monthly The first Friday of the month
Personal Income and outlays BEA Monthly 4-5 weeks after month\’s end
Productivity and costs BLS Quarterly Approximately five weeks after previous
quarter\’s end
GDP BEA Quarterly Three months after quarter ends
Prices
Consumer price index (CPI) BLS Monthly Last Tuesday of the month
Producer price index (PPI) BLS Monthly Second or third week of the month
Forward looking
New residential construction CB Monthly On or around the 17th of the month
FOMC meeting minutes FRB Every six-week




Notes: FRB, Federal Reserve Board; BLS, Bureau of Labor and Statistics; BEA, Bureau of Economic
Analysis; CB, US Census Bureau. This table reports release timing, the institution that makes the release and









































shocks and conditional variances, respectively, o the constant long run volatility of the
return process.
GARCH models have many appealing characteristics. They manage to capture the
volatility clustering phenomenon, which is an important empirical characteristic of asset
distributions. Moreover the return distribution that evolves from a GARCH process has
fatter tails than a normal distribution, which is again documented by many researchers.
They also have long run forecasting abilities, by capturing the concept of mean reversion
with the help of a constant intercept term.
Our analysis includes the following models. Models I through III employ only positive,
negative and neutral signal dummies as exogenous variables in the variance equation of
GARCH (1, 1), respectively:
Rt ¼ mþet




Results are summarized in Table VI. As suggested by a highly significant GARCH
coefficient and sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients that is close to unity, all of our models
are covariance stationary and the conditional variance exhibits a high level of persistence.
The Ljung-Box test statistics based on squared residuals indicates that there are no serial
correlations. We report coefficients and robust t-statistics.
H2 H1 H3
β t-value β t-value β t-value
Constant in mean 0.065 5.639 0.068 5.867 0.066 5.656
Constant in Var. 0.015 3.312 0.016 3.573 0.023 4.267
ARCH(1) 0.074 31.778 0.075 31.850 0.074 31.435
GARCH(1) 0.917 234.507 0.916 230.764 0.915 217.200
Positive signals 0.016 1.209
Negative signals 0.066 3.353***
Neutral signals −0.013 −2.920***
Controls
CPI −0.017 −0.417 −0.024 −0.621 −0.010 −0.243
Unemp. 0.095 3.140*** 0.091 3.002*** 0.097 3.288***
IPCU −0.036 −0.884 −0.052 −1.285 −0.025 −0.632
ResCons −0.018 −0.474 0.006 0.161 −0.032 −0.910
PPI 0.110 3.971*** 0.084 2.640*** 0.108 3.788***
GDP −0.164 −4.951*** −0.153 −4.542*** −0.144 −4.096***
PI 0.013 0.408 −0.003 −0.103 0.005 0.167
ProdCosts −0.097 −3.201*** −0.094 −3.103*** −0.084 −2.882***
Notes: This table presents results for the estimation of following GARCH models:
Rt ¼ mþet




Models I-III include only positive, negative and neutral signals that the president sends to investors,
respectively. Macroeconomic announcements enter the conditional variance equation as control dummies.
The return series is the S&P 500 Composite Index daily returns. Sample period is 1981-1999. We report
the coefficients and robust t-statistics calculated with the Bollerslev-Wooldridge method. *,**,***Significant
at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively
Table VI.
GARCH (1, 1)










































Presidential rhetoric that was positive was not significant, hence H1 was not supported
(Beta: 0.016; t-value 1.209). President’s negative signals have an increasing effect on the volatility
of the S&P 500 Index supporting H2 (β: 0.066; t-value 3.353). President’s Neutral statements,
or reinforcements of prior information, decrease market volatility providing support for H3
(β: 0.013; t-value 2.920). We discuss these findings further in the discussions section.
In line with prior literature, we find that macroeconomic announcements such as CPI,
PPI, industrial production/capacity utilization, GDP, employment situation, and personal
income and outlays create short term fluctuations in the markets. As a robustness check we
conducted the regressions removing days when there is both a positive and negative signal
and the results were similar.
Conclusions and future research
Overall, we have presented four major findings for leadership theory. First, we have
identified several gaps in the leadership field that we have attempted to address. Our review
of the leadership literature suggested that the past research focused mainly upon the direct
followers of leaders. Although the president has direct followers, we focused more upon the
role of president and how his rhetoric affects other stakeholders, in this research, investors.
We also noted that the leadership research suggested that the consequences of leaders’
behaviors should be explored. Our research illustrated a relationship with the leaders’
behavior (commenting on the economy through his rhetoric) and how the market reacted.
Finally, there has been little attention to how leaders communicate about economic and
marketplace events. Our research directly tested this past concern and found presidents are
continuously communicating about these events with both new information and repeating
of their earlier comments.
Second, that presidential rhetoric is influential and when they are addressing economic
policy the market reacts to his signals. Our research continued the stream of rhetorical
leadership (Naidoo and Lord, 2008) through the president as research suggests
communication is an essential aspect of the leadership process and that the president is
one of the most influential people. Although no research has explored whether presidential
rhetoric indeed is as influential as to affect the stock market volatility. Our research
concludes that when presidential rhetoric is in regard to the economy, inflation, interest
rates or the deficit, investors will rebalance their portfolio and abnormal volatility will occur.
Third, we categorized the presidential rhetoric as positive, negative, or neutral to
understand the impact of the type of rhetoric that affects risk averse investors. Our results
indicate that negative rhetoric from the president will cause the greatest volatility in the
marketplace. This is typically due to the risk aversion of investors and the media prefers to
cover negative news over positive news so will apply more resources to report this new
information. Neutral rhetorical comments by the president illustrated decreased volatility,
as the president was signaling that there was no news forthcoming and the investors had all
the public marketplace information available. Neutral comments are supported by past
research as just mentioning an issue heightens public concern while ignoring an issue
(neutral rhetoric) also has important implications and sends signals.
Positive presidential rhetoric was not significant and H1 was not supported. Although
our arguments suggested a relationship, leadership research in regard to charismatic
leadership provides a possible explanation (although one could argue Bush was not
charismatic, both Reagan and Clinton are considered very high in charisma according to
past research). Charismatic leaders are inspirational, use persuasive rhetoric, and express
more positive emotions (Beck et al., 2012) and as such the marketplace would expect a
continuous stream of positive information. Hence, savvy investors will not rebalance their
portfolio based on positive information that is continually entering the marketplace from the







































Fourth, we used a theoretical foundation of signaling theory. Although there is some
rhetorical leadership research that utilizes signaling (e.g. Bligh and Hess, 2007;
Walumbwa et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2004; Treadway et al., 2009) but very little research is
directly associated signaling theory with leadership rhetoric. Rhetoric is formal and
informal communication used by leaders to convey their message to stakeholders and
can include voice inflections, eye contact or lack thereof, use of figurative language
and imagery, use of stories and metaphors, etc. As such the meaning can often be emotive
and is a signal, much often less a concrete statement. Our foundation of signaling theory
suggests that when presidential rhetoric is used, investors will react and market volatility
will be effected. We suggest that signaling theory should be considered in future rhetorical
leadership research.
It is important to note that this study, although it is over 20 years with over 51,000 pages
of documentation, is on three presidents and their rhetoric due to the limitation of the
availability of the data. This type of research can be important in exploratory research to
identify constructs, but we realize much more work will be needed to establish an empirical
link between leadership rhetoric and consequences. Also, this research is focused on other
stakeholders, not direct followers, and more research needs to evaluate that link. Future
research will also need to evaluate actual messages and the signal and the strength of the
reaction by stakeholders.
Implications for managers and organizations
There are many implications for managers and organizations. Managers are always
attempting to develop future strategy through external environmental analysis. Their
future tactics depend upon an accurate assessment of how to utilize their current internal
core competencies in regard to the changing global facets of the marketplace. If managers
can include one more variable, that of presidential rhetoric, this will assist them in
determining the future of the marketplace. Items of critical importance could be issuance of
stock, sales figures, borrowing, bonds, inventory management, etc. that could be directly
influenced by presidential rhetoric due to stock market volatility. Also most top managers’
compensation is tied to their firms’ stock price (stock, stock options, etc.) and presidential
rhetoric could influence their compensation.
From an investor’s view, the implications are enormous, as they trade within seconds of
new information and first movers could reap the largest rewards. For example, when
negative presidential rhetoric is announced, market volatility is predicted. Savvy investors
could then identify where the re-investment would take place and “short” industries that
would be dropping and “buy” into industries that would be rising. There are many
techniques and portfolio positions that these professionals can take, but just being aware
that presidential rhetoric affects the volatility of the stock market will give these
professional investors and advantage.
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